I had hoped that the page of future history might record the great fact that in one spot in the Eastern World the advent of Christian civilisation did not bring with it its usual attendants of rapine and bloodshed ;  this fond hope, I fear, is to be disappointed.  I would sooner see all the treaties with this country torn up, and Japan returned to its old state of isolation, than witness the horrors of war inflicted upon this peaceful people and happy land.
—TOWNSEND HARRIS, first American consul-general to Japan.

THE “ well-oiled ” military machine of Japan, to employ the newspaper jargon, has crushed all opposition in Manchuria and has even moved into Jehol.  It is, indeed, well lubricated by the industry, efficiency and progressiveness of the Japanese.  Less than three-quarters of a century ago these people were dependent on medieval instruments of war; and, considering the way they have handled all the lethal apparatus of 1933, their adaptability is astonishing.  But the monster which they have so ably harnessed manifests most of the customary traits—and some others which occidental countries have not yet developed.  How the Japanese reached this high stage of machine gun culture is a fascinating story.

The first firearms beheld by innocent Japanese eyes were blunderbusses in the hands of the Dutch who landed on the islands in 1540.  The Dutch received a rather singular welcome ;  they were overwhelmed with a politeness never seen by Westerners, but they were firmly requested to stay at a safe distance on a tiny island off the coast.  For centuries the Japanese consented to trade with the Europeans in this distant manner.  They took the Western traders’ novel articles ;  in their intelligent way they even copied some of them ;  and among these was the unwieldy musket of the time.  But the Nipponese took it no more seriously than any other trifle from Amsterdam or Rotterdam.1

True, their own weapons could easily be improved upon, according to European lights.  They had the konbo, a long stick made of iron and wood, which was the weapon of the varlets, and the broadsword, which the high-born Samurai used.  But according to the doctrines of the Bushido (Way of the Warrior), honourable warriors had to meet their adversaries face to face with cold steel ;  and a blunderbuss, however defective its aim might be at hundred paces, was decidedly bad form for any Samurai.  Tradition was all against the new and cowardly device.

Beside the konbo and the broadsword there were the naginata or long-handled falchion, the bow and arrow, and those elaborate suits of armour that are now the amazement of the museum visitor :  these were the equipment of Japanese soldiers until the nineteenth century.  The Japanese tinkered with firearms and employed them in winging birds, but that was about all.  Factories for the new fowling pieces did not exist, for the Japanese were accustomed to making their medieval weapons in various shapes and designs according to their individual fancies and ideas.  Mass production of arms was, of course, still in the womb of time.

Amid these backward habits Japan drowsed until 1807.  In that year a Russian expedition landed forcibly on the main island and in the following year a British ship threatened Nagasaki.  The dreamer stirred a little, but was not fully awakened until “ four black ships of evil mien ” anchored off Tokyo in 1853.  It was Commodore Perry, U.S.N., who had come to obtain a commercial treaty with the Japanese and to make arrangements about shipwrecked sailors of American whaling vessels.  The Commodore had an exquisite sense of the theatre, and with the aid of a brass band and four tall negroes from the ship’s crew—they towered a foot and a half over the diminutive islanders—he made such a profound impression on the Japanese that they fled to their temples to pray for deliverance.  Perry’s gifts of firearms, a toy railway, telegraph instruments, books, champagne, and many barrels of whisky dispersed some of the original terror, but the American was unable to complete his treaty negotiations until his return in the following year.2

For centuries the Shogun, greatest of feudal lords, ruled Japan from his capital Yedo, and kept the Emperor in virtual captivity in Kyoto as a mere ceremonial and religious official.  Now the advent of the strange trousered white men, with their death-dealing cannon, stirred up one of the more progressive Shoguns, who felt a desire to study and import Western methods just to be on the safe side in case the visitors should turn belligerent.  The young heir to the throne, too, was eager to imitate the occidentals ;  and so a rapprochement was effected between the up-to-date Shogun and the royal house.

The Western intruders did show their teeth in 1863 when three Englishmen, who were so incautious as to ride their horses into a ceremonial parade, were summarily cut down.  Thereupon a British fleet appeared demanding a large indemnity.  The Shogun refused, and the British bombarded the town of Kagoshini.  The game was up.  The Shogun realised that his precious palace overlooking the harbour was at the mercy of the British guns and he paid the indemnity.

The game was up, likewise, for the backward shogunate.  The majority of the feudal lords had become so “ civilised ” and unwarlike that all they were good for was to sip rice wine and paint wall screens after the manner of Hokusai.  The progressive members of the clans determined to restore the Emperor to power as a symbol of enlightenment.  In 1867 the old order fell, and in the following year the most “ go-getting ” Son of Heaven in many a century ascended the throne which was now dominant over the shogunate.

All progressive Japan rejoiced and rushed hurriedly into the business of importing new customs and discarding old.  But the American consul-general, a farsighted man named Townsend Harris, wrote in his diary :  “ Half-past two p.m. To-day I hoist the first consular flag ever seen in this Empire.  Grave reflections.  Ominous of change.  Undoubtedly the beginning of the end.  Query :  if for the real good of Japan.”3

In the decade which followed Japan was too busy to ask such metaphysical questions.  The new era was militaristic from the start, but at first the Japanese had to be content with rather elementary weapons.  The Dutch had been there first, and it was their Gewehr which was copied in the first factories established on the islands.  The guns of Commodore Perry had awakened the medieval Japanese, and good guns have been their concern ever since.  Already in 1858, in the commercial treaty with the United States, they had definitely stipulated that they might purchase ships of war, arms and munitions in the United States and employ American experts to train them in arms making.4  The inefficient Dutch guns were soon discarded in favour of the French “ minie ” rifle, and for some time the French military technique and tactics were followed.  Foreigners were, of course, imported to organise the armament industry, and simultaneously that phenomenon, Hashimuro Togo, the “ Japanese schoolboy,” appeared in Western universities, diligently engaged in absorbing Western culture.

But these were only sporadic efforts.  The greatest impetus to the Japanese munitions industry came after the civil war of 1877.  A Japanese general, who wished to be considerably more progressive than his fellows, started an insurrection in that year, and all the power of the Empire was brought to bear before he was put down.  He committed hari-kiri, but the arms industry rose in greater strength from his ashes.  During the insurrection, orders had poured into the arms factories in such huge quantities that even women had to be pressed into service to speed up production.  It was the first appearance of female labour in Japanese industry.  It was a sign of the times, and the government, to prevent another such shortage in arms, decided to accelerate the development of the arms industry.

Grinning politely, Japanese students now spread to all corners of the Occident.  They were seen at Essen, at Creusot, at Wilmington, wherever the accommodating forges of the arms makers flared.  Representatives of these firms paid return calls, and business in the arms industry became very brisk.  So quick were these eager Japs to pick up the new technique that in 1880 a Major Murata Tsuneyoshi designed a rifle which was so effective that it was adopted officially by the government.  With the coming of the Murata, the brand “ Made in Japan ” appeared for the first time in the international arms traffic.5

Naval construction had advanced, too, but more slowly.  The first warships owned by the Japanese were—ironically—presented to them by the Russians, in gratitude for help given to a shipwrecked Russian squadron.  All through the sixties and seventies the Japs studied in foreign shipyards and imported English naval architects.  Sir William White, afterward chief designer of the British navy, was one of those most responsible for the successful construction of Japanese men-of-war.6

Sir William, who late in his career was attached to the British Admiralty, had spent some time in the employ of the firm of Armstrong.  He was not unworthy of his hire.  He it was who saw the advantage of exploiting the Far Eastern situation for the best interests of the armament company stockholders.  When, in connection with the Franco-Chinese war in Tonkin, Admiral Courbet cruised up and down the South China coast throwing shells into bamboo villages, Sir William made his report to Armstrong’s :  “ Orders can only be taken when the Chinese are in the humour and the destruction of their men-of-war the other day, instead of depressing them, I am quite sure will stir them up to further endeavours.”  He was correct ;  the Chinese were so stirred up that they gave Sir William the orders he wanted.

This was an excellent opportunity to point out to the Japanese the growing menace of the Chinese fleet, built as it was by so good a firm as Armstrong’s.  China meanwhile had been gazing apprehensively across the Sea of Japan, anxious over the growing military power of its island neighbour.  Sir William’s adulant biographer summarised this gratifying situation very neatly :

“ White was not unwilling to play the part of honnête courtier by pointing out the growth of the Japanese navy to his Chinese clients, or of the Chinese to their indomitable rivals.  In doing so, he was careful to insist on the confidential nature of his designs and the daily progress of our scientific knowledge.  By such means he was able to increase the profits of the great company which employed him, to extend what is perhaps the most important of national industries, and to kindle in the hearts of two Asiatic peoples the flames of an enlightened and sacred patriotism.”

Nor did the benevolent Sir William neglect the patriotism of his own people in this affair.  He reported to his superiors in London—and it is hardly possible that they kept the Admiralty in ignorance—“ They (the Japanese) will receive in the next few years a very great accession of strength which obviously must have a direct bearing on the types and numbers of ships of the Royal Navy required for the defence of our interests in Eastern seas.”7

The Japanese certainly did agree with Sir William’s biographer that arms were the country’s most important industry.  What had impressed them first and most about the Westerners was their arms, and they believed these to be the secret of their power.  When they began to “ westernise,” therefore, arms, modern, up-to-date efficient war engines, were first on their programme.  At first they had to buy finished arms from the West, but after a time they decided to have their own arms industry.  The manufacture of armaments was the first Western industry to be introduced into Japan and in many ways it remained the most important.  Other industries arose as auxiliaries to this, in order to supply raw materials or accessories.  The arms industry was built as the very foundation of Japanese economic life ;  all other industries were built round it ;  its prosperity or decline was a reliable index to the economic life of the islands.  Furthermore, the budget expenditures for arms exceeded those for any other purpose and the government loans for war and armaments were vastly in excess of those for any peaceful, industrial or social developments.8  In short, Japan made the logical deductions from her observation of the West.  Military power, she believed, had given dominance to the West ;  hence her people became soldiers, her first and chief industry was the manufacture of armaments, and her entire economic structure was erected with the purpose of serving as a war arsenal.

Nor was industry alone in this military philosophy.  The political scheme of things also was oriented toward war in this rule of the new Samurai.  Japanese generals and statesmen had travelled abroad and some had stopped in Potsdam to gaze appreciatively at the dominating figure of Bismarck.  The lesson was not lost on them and one of these travellers was so enthusiastic over this new Kultur that he paused on the way back through the United States to deplore the fact that Abraham Lincoln had not been intelligent enough to see the wisdom of making himself dictator.  But when these wisdom-seekers returned to the shade of their cherry blossoms, they arranged the Cabinet to suit the taste of the most military minded.  The positions of Minister of the Navy and Minister of the Army were henceforth filled by high ranking officers of these two branches of government.  The legislative bodies were given very little power in fact, however much they might have in theory.  The war-making power was in the hands of the Emperor who decided issues of this kind with the advice of his “ Cabinet.”  The Emperor Meiji, who gave his name to this era the new Era of Enlightenment it was called—was fully in harmony with these arrangements.  He had all the instincts of a Prussian Junker, believed in military dominance, and when he could not ride at the head of his cavalry, he practised the equestrian arts on a wooden horse in his palace.9

Sir William White received the warm congratulations of this governing group after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894.  Admiral Ito wrote to tell him how splendidly two cruisers, which the Englishman had designed, fought in the famous battle of Yalu, where the Chinese warships had been badly defeated.  To quote the quaint English of Ito, “ the behaviour of the cruisers was in all respects unblamable.”  In fact, this signal success of Japanese valour and Armstrong’s cruisers obtained for Japan loans which the big bankers of London and Paris had hitherto withheld.  The American banker, Jacob Schiff, was so impressed that he organised a consortium of American and English banks in the first large loan to the Japanese government.  The Japanese incidentally got more than money as a result of this war ;  they obtained possession of Formosa and various important islands—the beginnings of Japanese imperial expansion.  Only the intervention of the Western powers prevented them at this time from gaining a foothold on the Chinese mainland.10

Townsend Harris must have shaken his head with all the satisfaction of a successful prophet in 1904, when Japan startled the world with her defeat of the Russians.  The destruction of the Russian fleet in the Sea of Japan by Admiral Togo was an epochal victory.  Together with the correspondingly great victories of the army at Port Arthur, it placed Japan in the front rank of military powers.  Even if she did have to depend on the willing ministrations of Messrs. Vickers, Krupp, Schneider, and Bannerman during the war, she had demonstrated that she was able to make good use of the implements and organization of the modern industrial era.

From medieval primitiveness to modern industrialism in less than a half-century—that was a record of achievement.  The first daily newspaper in 1871, the first railroad built by the British in 1873, baseball introduced by American missionaries in 1876, horse cars two years later, Hotchkiss guns right after that, etc., etc.  That is a brief recapitulation of the stages of her progress.  She was now almost as fully organised as the Kaiser’s Germany or Lord Fisher’s Britannia.

The Japanese arms industry did not follow exactly the Western pattern.  At the beginning, the progressive Shoguns and the new imperial power had to set the wheels going, so it was inevitable that government arsenals should manufacture all arms.  During the nineteenth century there were no Japanese counterparts of Krupp or Vickers, no private industries of war at all.  After the Russian war, however, it was seen that these arsenals could not keep up with the demand when a real conflict was in progress.  As a result of this observation, the government permitted the founding of the Japan Steel Works, with the assistance of army and navy specialists, the first and only privately owned arms factory in the country.  It was capitalised at 15 million yen and a considerable block of shares was acquired by Vickers.  The factory turned out gun barrels, carriages, torpedo tubes, steel castings, and machine work of all kinds.11

The year 1913 found the Japanese spending 33 per cent of the national budget for arms—arms which were most useful in the following years when Japan captured Germany’s Eastern possessions.  But the richest harvest came during the World War, when Japanese factories and arsenals worked night and day supplying arms and ammunition to their Western allies.  Just as in America, huge profits were earned, and by the end of the war the island empire was bursting with money.

But the arms industry, which was the lodestar of the industrial development of Japan, now became something of an incubus.  It had indeed, as the focal point around which all other machines were placed, greatly stimulated the development of Japan.  But now Japanese experts were forced to admit that the economic structure of the country was decidedly lopsided.  Capital, which otherwise would have been spent for the good of industry as a whole, now flowed into the arms industry.  One of these experts declared :

“ The gradual decrease in the capacity of the nation in economy and general industry occurred thus.  The profits which the military industry will bring to the national economy, hereafter, by its expansion, will amount to nothing if the loss caused by same be set off—rather the latter might be greater.”12

With such a voracious industry still growing, it is not surprising that China became a good customer of her enemy neighbour.  In 1930 Japan supplied 37.5 per cent. of the arms used by China.  How much these arms and the Japanese arms interests had to do with the military unrest and internecine strife in China—strife which Japan has seized as pretext for her own territorial expansion—cannot even be estimated.13

This Chinese situation has fascinated students of the arms merchants for some time.  One observer summed up the picture as follows :

“ For twenty years this immense country has been the prey of a dozen rascals, real fomenters of war who raise mercenary armies.  These armies have European equipment, and if anyone wants to know where the equipment comes from he has only to follow in the newspapers the visits of their officers to Creusot, Saint-Etienne, Krupp, and Vickers.  The big armament firms provide them abundantly with cannon, machine guns, and munitions, and are paid with the proceeds of the pillage of the provinces.  Every general has his sleeping partner whose name can be found in the banks of Hong Kong, Paris, New York, Yokohama, or even Moscow.  Simple shifts of capital determine the separation or fusion of armies.  The sleeping partners change generals or the generals change sleeping partners.  This system has unleashed all the horrors of the Thirty Years War on this unfortunate country.”14

This gives an excellent background for the recent Japanese venture in Manchuria.  As the clouds of war gathered, Shanghai became a large centre of the arms industry.  Japanese factories, as noted, sold munitions to the Chinese there.  Schneider and Skoda and other leaders in this traffic acquired a huge building in the International Settlement.  From this centre public opinion in Japan and China was influenced and made ready for war.  Three great journals, one in English, one in Japanese, and one in Chinese, amply supplied by advertising from the munitions makers, began to shriek for war.  The English paper, the Shanghai Post, was cynical enough to remark that “ a war would undoubtedly be very helpful to many branches of industry.”15

Hamburg soon became the shipping centre for German, French, and Czechoslovak armament manufacturers.  The extent of the traffic may be gauged by the following facts.  On February 2, 1932, two ships departed for Japan loaded with grenades, dynamite and aeroplane parts ;  on February 7, Skoda sent 1,700 cases of ammunition ;  on February 8, a Norwegian vessel called for 1,000 cases of explosives destined for the Far East ;  on the same day the French sent machine guns valued at 100 million francs.  That is the record for one week.

Many of these shipments were disguised.  Poison gas, which was unloaded by men wearing gas masks, was marked as “ Exterminator for the protection of plants,” and munitions were packed in huge crates and neatly labelled “ Pianos.”  Night and day work was reported from many arms factories, and many men were added to the pay rolls of the arms makers.  In order to avoid sabotage and labour trouble, some factories followed the practice of manufacturing only parts of arms, leaving the assembling to be done in the Far East.  Now and then socialist and pacifist labour groups delayed shipment of arms by demonstrations or strikes ;  on the other hand it is reported that a German labour leader in the Ruhr declared :  “ We would rejoice if war broke out in the Far East.  Then our workers would again fill their pocket-books.”16

Accurate statistics are difficult to secure, but it would seem that Great Britain was the chief source of supply for Japan.  This seems only natural, since Britain had taken the leading rô1e in furnishing arms and building up the arms industry these.  Chinese financial troubles made the arms merchants a bit wary in selling to her ;  hence it is not surprising that exports to Japan from Britain were four times ;  as great as those to China.  Official statistics on this traffic, whether derived from the League of Nations or from the British Board of Trade, are very fragmentary, because they do not include aeroplanes, ships of war or transports, chemicals, scrap iron, and all manner of raw materials.17

British exports include thousands of machine guns, millions of rounds of ammunition, aircraft and antiaircraft guns, millions of shells and grenades and bombs, and steamships.  Japan purchased 76 British ships, many of them for scrap iron, others, among them one of 45,000 tons, for transporting troops and supplies to the Chinese mainland.  Officially, British exports of war materials to the Far East amounted to £5,039,836 in 1929, £3,969,372 in 1930, and £3,281,050 in 1931.  But in this case these figures belong in the third category of Mark Twain’s list of lies :  black lies, white lies, and statistics.

Even more is this so in the case of France.  French official figures list no arms exports to Japan.18  Statistics like these are almost fantastic.  Press reports have repeatedly indicated great activity in the French arms industry and they have specified that Japanese orders have caused the “ boom.”  One Paris report has it that the Japanese representative “ coolly gave an order for the entire stock of munitions on hand in the factories and warehouses of the Schneider-Creusot Company to be sent immediately to Japan.  Now the 12,000 employees in this great armament town are working on a fresh order so large that workshops usually reserved for the manufacture of tractor wheels, locomotive parts and rails, and other instruments of peace, have been converted into munition shops.”19  A United Press report of March 11, 1933, declares that French arms plants are working overtime for Japan.  There is a “boom” at the aircraft works at Breguet and Potez.  “Whippet” tanks ordered from the Renault Motor Works were tested in the Jehol drive.  Hotchkiss is filling large orders for machine guns, and the Japanese military attaché in Paris has a permanent room on the Hotchkiss testing range.20  The New York Times reports that the export of arms by France went up 50 per cent. in the first six months of 1933 and that the chief purchasers of these arms are Japan, China, and the South and Central American republics.21  Artillery exports have gone up from 187 tons to 1,017 tons, in francs, from 13,056,000 to 83,900,000.22  France has also shipped powder to German factories in order to make cartridges for the Far East.23  There can hardly be a doubt then that the French arms industry is actively aiding the Far Eastern “ war.”  Schneider’s subsidiary, Skoda, is also an active participant in this traffic, as its greatly increased profits clearly indicate.24

The rô1e of the arms makers of the United States in this Far Eastern imbroglio has not been very prominent.  This is probably due to the higher prices of American manufactured arms.25  The statement frequently made that American armament makers were shipping to Japan nearly $200,000,000 worth of goods appears to be a wild and uncorroborated tale.26  Trade in chemicals, scrap iron, and other raw materials flourished.  Between January 17 and February 23, 1933, a total of 5,000 tons of nitrate of soda, the main ingredient of TNT, was shipped to Japan from Newport News alone.27  No adequate statistics are avail able on other items.  The steel industry of Japan, for instance, has made great strides forward in the last years until it has come to occupy the ninth place in the world.  But there is a dearth of local resources, and iron ore and scrap iron must be bought largely abroad.  Imports for finished steel products normally have almost ceased ;  by contrast, imports for iron ore and scrap iron have steadily increased.  The United States has become the chief source of steel scrap for Japan, and Japan is the best customer for this raw material which the United States has.  Taking items like these into consideration, the role of the American arms makers in the Manchurian expedition of Japan has not been unimportant.28

Other countries have not been overlooked in the arms orders from the Far East.  Germany is reported by both Japan and China as one of their chief sources of Supply.29  The German Bergius process of deriving oil from coal was sought by Japanese agents from the Royal Dutch Oil Company, because Japan had only eight months’ supply of fuel.30  Switzerland has received large orders from China after a huge bribe was passed between a Swiss military man and the Chinese purchasing agent.31  Holland, Belgium, and Norway are also active in the traffic.32

The League of Nations was concerned with the Sino-Japanese conflict.  The Lytton Report found Japan guilty of aggression and there was much talk of a boycott against that country.  Meanwhile public opinion in Great Britain was exerting pressure on the government to do something about the British exports in war materials to the Far East.  Great Britain has a licensing system for the arms industry, and this could readily be invoked to halt the traffic in arms.  Of course, what the League and others had in mind was an embargo on arms exports to Japan alone, but the British government now placed an embargo on exports to Japan and China.  This was not the act of a pacifist government but a clever political trick, because it did not antagonise Japan nearly so much as a one-sided embargo would have done.  But the British arms merchants were not worried.  They went right on with the manufacture of arms and before long they were able to sell again to both belligerents.  Since no other nation followed the lead of Great Britain, the embargo was soon revoked and the British government could point to a “ noble gesture ” which other governments had nullified by their inaction.

The most curious incident of this entire episode happened in a British arms factory.  It was told to the House of Commons on February 27, 1933, by Mr. Morgan Jones, M.P.

“ At a certain factory armaments were being prepared in one part of the building for Japan and in another for China.  By an unfortunate chance, the representatives of both governments arrived at the factory at the same time and were shown into the same room.  There they began to discuss the charges made by the firm for their munitions, with the result that they agreed to a joint ultimatum asking for a reduction in prices.”33

An octopus never starves, particularly in Japan, where military hegemony is complete.  While far-seeing Japanese statesmen and economists wonder where the nation is heading, now that Manchuria and Jehol have been taken, they look out upon an amazing picture, a new visage which the country of the Mikado has acquired.  Societies of the Black Dragon—far fiercer than Fascisti or Nazis—assassinations of conciliatory statesmen, the sword-rattlers running the show, a national economic system which clusters around the arms factories like a medieval town encircling a baron’s castle.  Yet it is only eighty years since the painters of the school of Hokusai were the chief artisans of the islands, since the noble broadsword was the sole accepted implement of honourable combat, and since the Son of Heaven dozed peacefully before a Shinto shrine.  The four black ships from the Occident were indeed of “ evil mien.”

1 Masuda, Military Industries of Japan, pp. 3-26;  "The Reign Meiji," pp. 30-37; 87-97, Fortune, July, 1933.

2 Fortune, op. cit.

3 Fortune, op. cit.

4 Payson J. Treat, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 1853-1895, Vol. I, p. 59.

5 Masuda, op. cit., p. 42.

6 Frederic Manning, The Life of Sir William White.

7 Manning, op. cit., p. 335ss, 345.

8 Giichi Ono, War and Armament Expenditure of Japan;  Ushisaburo Kobayashi, War and Armament Loans of Japan;  Giichi Ono, Expenditures of the Sino-Japanese War;  Ushisaburo Kobayashi, War and Armament Taxes of Japan;  Gotara Ogawa, Expenditures of the Russo-Japanese War.

9 Fortune, op. cit.

10 Manning, op. cit., p. 340ss;  Fortune, op. cit.

11 Masuda, op. cit., pp. 85-160, 183.

12 Masuda, op. cit., p. 261.

13 Allard, op. cit.

14 Francis Delaisi, cited in Georges Hoog, op. cit., p. 204.

15 H.C. Engelbrecht, "The Traffic in Death," World Tomorrow, Oct. 5, 1932.

16 Engelbrecht, ibid.

17 Union of Democratic Control, Statistics showing the Trade in Arms and Ammunition between the Armament Firms of Great Britain and the Far East, August, 1931 to January, 1933;  Anonymous, "L’Angleterre principal fournisseur de guerre du Japon," Front Mondial, March, 1933. p. II;  Anonymous, "How the Arms Traffic is Stimulated by Far Eastern Crisis," China Weekly Review, January 7, 1933, pp. 258-260;  Anonymous, "Exports of War Materials from Britain Decreases," China Weekly Review, December 31, 1932, p. 225; Fenner Brockway, The Bloody Traffic, pp. 107-118.

18 William T. Stone, "International Traffic in Arms and Ammunition," Foreign Policy Reports, Vol. IX, No. 12, August 16, 1933, p. 131.

19 Fenner Brockway, op. cit., p. 112.

20 New York Herald Tribune, March 12, 1933.

21 New York Times, "Exports of Arms by France up 50 per cent," July 27, 1933.

22 Anonymous, "Les Exportations d’Armes de la France," Front Mondial, March, 1933, p. II.

23 National Council for Prevention of War, Who Wants War ?

24 Union of Democratic Control, Patriotism, Ltd., p. 30.

25 William T. Stone, op. cit., p. 132.

26 For instance, in George A. Drew, Enemies of Peace, p. II.  Official figures of the U.S. Department of Commerce list exports in firearms, ammunition, aircraft and explosives as follows:  To Japan, $147,213 in 1931, and $371,635 for 1932; to China, $1,115,797 in 1931, and $205,315 in 1932. Most of these exports were aeroplanes and parts.

27 National Council for Prevention of War, Who Wants War ?

28 George S. Herrick, "Japan’s Steel Industry has Become Our Best Scrap Customer Abroad," Iron Age, July 10, 1930, pp. 84-86;  Harold Huggins, "Steel Industry of Japan," Far Eastern Review, October, 1931-February, 1932.

29 William T. Stone, op. cit., p. 132.

30 New York Herald Tribune, March 12, 1933.

31 Engelbrecht, op. cit., p. 311.

32 Front Mondial, March, 1933, p. II.

33 Fenner Brockway, op. cit., p. 114.