Christopher Hollis
Two Nations

Chapter XIX — Crisis and the Counter Attack

The City of London made no serious attempt to prevent the Socialists from succeeding the Conservatives in office in accordance with the regular routine in 1929. Of the members of the previous Socialist Cabinet, one alone, Colonel Wedgwood, had indulged in any radical criticisms of the financial system. He was omitted from the new ministry. There returned to the Treasury Mr. Philip Snowden (as he then was) a man hardly balanced in the fanaticism of his devotion to the gold standard or in his utter inability to understand what that standard was.

Meanwhile the return of Great Britain to gold had been followed by a period of high prosperity in the United States. Great as her prosperity was during those years, it was in no way artificial; there was no reason why it should not have been permanent, and indeed it would be very easy to argue that the standard of living of the American people was below rather than above what it should have been. For every year the United States was exporting large quantities of goods on loan and receiving for them no equivalent import. There was no reason why she should not have made her foreign debtors supply the keep of her tourists abroad and remittances of her emigrants and have cut down her exports so as to balance her imports, using the extra goods thus saved for the benefit of her own citizens or alternatively, if it was preferred, giving increased leisure to those who were, as it was, employed on production for this profitless export market.

What was the reason why the Americans continued to export more than they imported? Two quite different classes of Americans were engaged on the task of breaking the mastery of the City of London. On the one hand, were the manufacturers and the working classes who asked only for freedom from a tyranny and for prosperity. On the other hand were the gentlemen of Wall Street who wanted to prevent the City of London from playing the game of the world's usurer only in order that they might play that game themselves.

For a time the conflict between these two classes could be concealed. It could be concealed so long as the question of the repayment of foreign loans had not yet arisen. But it was inevitable that sooner or later foreign investors would begin to ask, "How can we be repaid so long as there is a high tariff which prevents foreigners from sending us their goods?" Payment in gold was really only a trick — a trick moreover that could only be played so long as the debtors had some gold to give. That would not be for long, for such gold as was not already in the vaults of New York was steadily pouring into the other great creditor of the world, France. Throughout the latter half of the 1920's her reserves of gold were increasing with a quite intolerable rapidity. In 1926 she held 20,425 million francs, in 1928 31,838 million, in 1929 41,622 million, in 1930 53,563 million, in 1931 66,863 million, in 1932 78,291 million.(205) In addition M. George Bonnet, then Minister of Finance, estimated that on 5th January, 1934, there were 30,000 million francs hoarded throughout France.(206)

Now France, like Great Britain and the United States, was "on gold." But her gold standard was a third standard, utterly different from either the American or the British. All demonstrations that French policy is an obstacle to the prosperity whether of France or of the world are, to a Frenchman, an irrelevancy. The object of French policy is not, it must be understood, prosperity; its object is security. Its first concern is to see to it that Frenchmen consume less than they produce. In that, thanks to the frugal habits of the nation, it has been successful. Its second concern has been to discover some means by which the equivalent of that surplus can be made available in the time of crisis. The first attempt to solve that problem was, in the years before the War, by foreign investment — mainly in Russia — but this experiment turned out so disastrously that the French are unwilling to repeat it. Reluctant to invest abroad at all, they positively refuse to invest save in short-term loans. They prefer rather to return to the principles of the old mercantilist philosophy of the seventeenth century, to receive the balance of their payments in gold and to hoard the gold against the day of crisis, when they will bring it out to buy the necessities of war. The French Government therefore hoards because it does not trust the foreigner, and the French peasant hoards because he does not trust the Government.

Therefore as a result of French policy there was no gold with which the debts to America could be paid. If they were to be paid, they had to be paid in goods and it was not possible to persuade further investors to send out more loans unless they could be persuaded that there was at least a prospect of foreign goods being admitted in repayment of them. President Hoover might argue,(207) "I believe we have to-day an equipment and a skill in production that yield us a surplus of commodities beyond any compensation we can usefully take by way of imported commodities. To me there is only one remedy, and that is by the systematic, permanent investment of our surplus production in reproductive works abroad. We thus reduce the return we must receive to a return of interest and profit." But permanent lending is a contradiction in terms, and the number of people who understood that this was merely a roundabout way of saying that the debts would never be paid at all was on the increase. Messrs. Foster and Catchings commented on the President's argument in their Profits,(208) "What does this mean? It seems to mean that if we work very hard, we can send more wealth abroad, and thus acquire more capital abroad, and thus possibly receive more interest and dividends from abroad, wherewith to acquire still more capital abroad, and so on, generation after generation, without finding any way whereby we or our children or our children's children can ever benefit greatly by our increased productivity. According to this theory our own standard of living must remain the same as though we had never produced all this surplus wealth."

Mr. John Foster Dulles, counsel to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, said,(209) at about the same time, "So long as we have a national policy of promoting exports, of protecting our industry by a high tariff, of full collection of debts — so long as we have such a policy and the basic economic conditions remain substantially as they are to-day — so long must we finance our exports very largely through the medium of loaning foreigners the money wherewith to pay for them." Strange as it may seem, this argument was intended by Mr. Dulles to be an argument for foreign loans, for it never occurred to him to ask whether a "national policy of promoting exports" was not a very silly policy. But, after he had done defending foreign loans, there was hardly anything to be added to the case against them.

It became clear that the debts could only be paid if the tariff was lowered so that foreign goods could come into America. But under conditions of free trade or conditions even approximating to free trade the foreign goods could always undersell the American goods because of the lower wages by which they were produced. Therefore, with the tariff reduced, American goods would only be able to hold their own in the American market if American wages were lowered. The American working man, like the English working man, would have to choose between low wages and unemployment.

It was this conflict between employers and their workmen on the one side and the financiers on the other that led America to her catastrophe. The issue was not clearly defined, for the financiers were astute enough to see that their victory was only possible if they spread as widely through the country as they could the habit of speculation. Therefore the banks lent wildly and assisted in the forcing up of securities to impossible heights by themselves investing their invented money on a prodigious scale. On 30th June, 1921, according to the Report of the President's Research Committee on Recent Social Trends in the United States, the investments of banks who were members of the Federal Reserve Board stood at $6,002 million. By 30th June, 1928, they had risen to $10,758 million.

How far the financiers foresaw the consequences of their policy, how far they did not foresee only because they preferred not to look ahead, how far they were genuinely blind, it is impossible to say. One can but describe the facts. Certainly the policy pursued was, at a time when the productivity of American industry was increasing with unexampled rapidity, to see to it that there should be no increase in the purchasing power of those who wanted the mass-produced articles which that industry was throwing on to the market. There was no such increase in purchasing power for two reasons. First, because there was no appreciable rise in the wages of the factory worker. While the output of industry rose between 1923 and 1929 from $25,850 million to $31,900 million, the sum total paid out in wages rose from $11,009 million to $11,684 million.(210) The one increased by 25 per cent while the other only increased by 5 per cent. Secondly, there was a sharp decline in the purchasing power of those engaged in the two great export businesses of cotton and corn. For the price received for these articles is the world price, that is to say, the price on the London market. That price, as has already been explained, fell heavily owing to the British policy of deflation.

On the other hand, the profits of the well-to-do, the non-wage earner, in America had everywhere increased. The result of the bank's investment policy was to force up the value of securities and, with the prospects of a continuing rise, those with money to spare spent it on buying securities instead of on buying commodities. Even foreign countries, who were still telling the Americans that they were too poor to pay their debts and who had borrowed from America large sums in order to preserve themselves from chaos, were able to lend back to America out of their bankruptcy no less than $2,131 million in long term investments and $2,437 million in short-term.(211) In 1929 the United States, though on balance enormously a creditor country, was yet at the same time probably more heavily in debt than she ever been before in her history.

The banks, having thus caused the speculation boom (whether they intended to cause it or not) now announced that it was their duty to step in and save the country by deflationary measures. Throughout 1928 and 1929 they pushed up the discount rate from 3 per cent to 4 per cent, to 4½ per cent, to 5 per cent, and finally to 6 per cent. The effect of this was indeed to stop speculation, but only as Mr. Hawtrey fairly says, in his Art of Central Banking, "by stopping prosperity." And, if one is to pay the bankers the compliment of assuming that they had any knowledge of the ABC of their own business, one can only conclude that their true purpose was not to stop speculation but to stop prosperity. Either the financial affairs of the nation were in the hands of men who simply did not know that if everybody bought securities the price of them rose, or alternatively the bankers purposely created the speculation in order that, under the excuse of killing it, they might kill the prosperity. Thus it might be possible to win the consent of the American people to free trade and its necessary consequence of low wages by making it appear that that collapse was the inevitable result of the high tariff. It is in all soberness hard to see how there is any third explanation of what happened.

I do not say that there was any secret document, signed by the masters of the credit machinery, in which they pledged themselves to work for such an end. But there was that very real, if tacit, agreement which comes from the breathing of the same ambient air. As Thomas W. Lamont of J. P. Morgan put it in his comments on the American Power Trust, "I wouldn't say, if I were you, that there was anything in the nature of a Trust. There isn't anything like that at all; what I would say is just simply that we and the banks and certain other companies interested in Power are all standing around in a co-operative frame of mind."

The Wall Street crash did not bring about an immediate collapse of the American tariff. The first result of it was that Americans, thinking that they had learnt in time of the folly of speculation, began to recall the gold that they had lent to Great Britain. Great Britain found that her gold reserves were vanishing away. The Labour Government was in power in Great Britain. But no member of it betrayed one inkling of understanding of what was happening. They inherited the gold standard from their so-called opponents and, as the country's gold holdings decreased, they obediently decreased its monetary supply, thinking apparently that the two were related by a law as inevitable as that of the multiplication table. The effects were of course those which the Federation of British Industries had predicted. Distress and unemployment increased with horrible rapidity. Utterly without a notion of the disease from which the country was suffering, its governors, who on the election platform a year or two before had announced that they alone had a remedy for unemployment and that, if they were returned to power, the sufferings of the poor would at last have an end — these men in their desperation appointed a committee which should investigate and report and tell them how to govern the country.

The Committee — the famous May Committee — issued its report in the summer of 1931. The medicine which it prescribed to the country was that of drastic economy. We were spending more than we could afford and, in order to balance our budget, we must reduce expenditure. As the numbers of the unemployed were rising with rapidity, factories at the same time were either working half-time or not working at all and our foreign customers were destroying their food because we refused to produce manufactured goods to exchange for it, the diagnosis was manifestly a false one. It was true that the nation was consuming more than it was producing, but it was consuming enormously less then it could produce. To seek to reduce consumption to actual production was about as sensible as it would be to cut a number of people's heads off because there were not enough hats to go round. What was wanted was not a reduction but an increase of purchasing power. But, if the country's currency was to remain tied to gold, then the May Committee was manifestly right. As gold left the country, the monetary supply must be reduced and such reduction could only be effected by a reduction of expenditure.

The Labour Cabinet, according to Mr. G.D.H. Cole,(212) never even debated the possibility of suspending the gold standard. They agreed to maintain it and to carry through the economies demanded by its maintenance and, since Great Britain was herself denuded of gold, they agreed to maintain it by borrowing gold from its only two substantial possessors — the financiers of New York and of Paris. Now the financiers of New York were anxious to compel a reduction in the dole paid to the British unemployed. For the reduction of wages is much easier when there is no dole for unemployment and, if the English dole were reduced, it would be easier to resist the demand for a dole in America. If the crisis did not make possible the reduction of American wages, there was, from the American financier's point of view, hardly any point in having it at all. Therefore they made the reduction of the English dole a condition of their granting of the loan of gold to the Bank of England.

Before this demand the majority of the Labour Cabinet, to their credit, revolted, though, as they still demanded the balancing of the budget and the maintenance of the gold standard, and had no coherent proposals how the budget could be balanced without the reduction of the dole, their revolt was a singularly futile one. The minority, of the Labour Cabinet did not even revolt at this humiliation. They accepted the terms of the American financiers. It is true that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, as a general rule, pretended that it was not American dictation which was responsible for the reduction of the dole, but in a moment of forgetfulness he admitted that it was so in the House of Commons in answer to a question from Mr. Frank Owen.(213) There was no limit to the sacrifices, which in the opinion of this minority, must be made to the sacred cause of gold. The Conservative and Liberal politicians agreed with them. The pretence that there was any difference between the parties was abandoned, and all joined together in a great National Government for the defence of gold.

Yet all was in vain. The gold still continued to flow out of the country. And one September Sunday we woke up to hear that the gold standard had been suspended. A banker has told the present writer how he went to his bank the next Monday expecting to find a queue of angry men demanding their deposits. There was nobody there. There was no queue anywhere in all England. The bankers and politicians had held over our heads the threat that, if the link with gold was snapped, the price-level would rocket up to the skies and the pound go the way of the post-War mark. The threat was found to be the purest moonshine. Not only did the price-level not get out of control; there was never the remotest chance of it getting out of control. Indeed the difficulty was to raise prices enough. Instead everything got a little better. Employment improved. Exports were easier. The beginnings of returning prosperity began to appear. It was as if a runner who had ploughed along with a heavy burden on his back had at last been able to throw that burden off and now ran free.

For years we had been told by the bankers that our troubles were due to our own laziness and stupidity and out-of-date equipment. We found that it was not so, that they were due rather to the standard which the bankers had themselves imposed upon us. "The game was played up to the limits of quixotry," wrote Mr. Keynes,(214) "even at the risk of driving British trade to a standstill." And then, when at last the game was of perforce abandoned and when the wheels of industry as a consequence began slowly to move again, we opened our newspapers and found to our amazement that it was the bankers who were taking to themselves the credit for having guided the country through its crisis. Their creatures, the politicians, made speeches in praise of their masters. It is impossible to withhold a certain tribute of admiration for the very impudence of the claim.

Yet I think that history will have to record that they made a false move, exaggerating a little the gullibility of the public. The important authority of Mr. R. G. Hawtry(215) has spoken of "central banks proceeding from their position of complacent detachment to generate depression, unemployment, bankruptcy, budget defaults, with all the resulting political and social convulsions, while Government after Government is broken because it can neither stem the flood of ruin, nor even provide tolerable palliatives to alleviate the consequences." And I think and hope that Sir Charles Morgan-Webb is right when he tells us, "The contemptuous references to the incompetence of the British manufacturer and to the laziness and greed of the British workman, as being responsible for disasters now known to have been due to the gold standard, have not been forgotten. There is an unshakable conviction in the minds of the leaders of industry and of the workers alike that the seven years of depression and humiliation from 1924 to 1931 were artificially induced, and artificially prolonged, by the Bank of England and the Treasury in order to restore and maintain the gold standard."(216)

Yet, if our monetary supply was not to be regulated by gold, there arose the question, "How then was it to be regulated?" To that question there was but one sane answer. "Go right back to the teaching of Bishop Berkeley and return to the ancient standard of Christendom, to the stable price-level." That policy had already been recommended by the Macmillan Report,(217) which said, "The ultimate aim should be the stability of the international price-level, meaning by this the composite price at wholesale of the principal foodstuffs and raw materials entering into international trade as measured by the best known wholesale index numbers." Such a declaration was eagerly welcomed in the British Dominions, whose whole economic life had been thrown into chaos by the British deflation and consequent collapse of the London prices of primary products. And therefore at the Ottawa Conference of 1932 the new policy was formally adopted. The Economist index was taken as the guide of British financial policy.

In that same year of 1932 there was a Presidential election in the United States. The Republicans with their high tariffs had by now served the purposes of finance. It was no longer desired to attract immigrants. What was now wanted was to attract goods from Europe for the payment of dividends. And, if the goods were to come in, the tariffs must come down. Therefore Mr. Hoover, the Republican, was defeated, and Mr. Roosevelt, the Democrat, was elected. Mr. Roosevelt was to enter upon his office in March, 1933. It is not, I hope, too cynical to imagine that it was not wholly a matter of chance that his inauguration happened to coincide with an enormous financial crisis and the whole country trembling upon the verge of chaos. In such a crisis it might reasonably be expected that the new President, terrified of his responsibility, would go on his knees to the masters of finance and beg them to save the country from final ruin. The price that they would have exacted would have been the reduction of the tariff. It would doubtless have been recommended to the people with some unctuous generalities about free trade and international comity, and they would have been offered the choice between employment at European wages and no employment at all.

If such were its calculations, then Wall Street had utterly misjudged its man. They had put into power a man who did not flinch in his courage, and who used the very magnitude of the crisis, which the financiers had created, for the financiers' undoing. He proclaimed his faith in two things — strange and unrelated to one who has not given his mind to such matters, intimately and necessarily inter-linked to their student. He proclaimed the reality of his religious faith and his intention of establishing a stable price-level — "a commodity dollar." "The United States," he wrote to the World Economic Conference, "seeks the kind of dollar which a generation hence will have the same purchasing and debt-paying power as the dollar value we hope to attain in the near future."

In his inaugural address on 4th March, 1933, he denounced without flinching the philosophy which had brought his country and the world to ruin and proclaimed without flinching the philosophy which alone could break that ruin. The world's troubles, he said, were "primarily ... because the rulers of the exchanges of mankind's goods have failed through their own stubbornness and their own incompetence, have admitted their failure and have abdicated. Practices of the unscrupulous money-changers stand indicted in the court of public opinion, rejected by the hearts and minds of men ... The money-changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of civilization. We may now restore that temple to the ancient truths.... In this dedication of a nation we humbly ask the blessing of God." It was the death-sentence of an economic system. But it was far more than that. It was the deliberate repudiation of a heresy that has cursed and warped the story of mankind for five hundred years — the gigantic heresy that Man is sufficient to himself and that it is possible to organize a human society apart from God.

In Dante's great vision of Hell, among the false Gods that have deceived mankind to none is there given a more shameful place than to Plutus. He is the most cowardly of them all. He alone is dumb, for Greed dare not honestly preach its gospel, since it is a gospel that can only be accepted when it is misunderstood. Before the words of a brave man it collapses, Dante tells us, "as the sails swollen with the wind fall when the mast breaks."(218) So it proved six hundred years after Dante died. If anything be certain of our times, it is certain that that day, 4th of March, 1933, will be remembered for ever as one of the great turning days in the history of mankind. And it is permissible to believe that there stood with the President that morning the spirits of those men throughout the ages who have fought for mankind the eternal battle against usury. Aristotle and Moses were there, who stand at the fundament of all Christian thought, and all the saints and doctors who have built upon their teaching, the prophets of every great religion that has ever made claim to the large allegiance of mankind, Dante and Shakespeare, Sir Thomas More, martyr for an even nobler cause, Charles II who was such an unconscionable time in dying and Charles I whom they killed so swiftly, Dryden, who earned by his immortal verse those guineas which he refused to earn by raising his tenants' rents, Bishop Berkeley, to whose ample vision the whole panorama of folly lay manifest, the great Napoleon who challenged the evil Thing in arms, Cobbett, "the horseman of apocalypse," who fought it with scorn, Shaftesbury, the lover of the poor, Jackson, to whom "these truths" were "self-evident," and Ruskin, driven to frenzy by the callousness of the world. There stood the spirits of this strange and ill-assorted company — men differing from one another in every taste and in every characteristic, united only in the unison with which they bear witness against the eternal lie of Shylock. "Or is your gold and silver ewes and rams?" asks Antonio. "I cannot tell," answers Shylock, lying. "I make it breed as fast."(219) Two years before, in 1931, the great Pope had sent forth his lamentation. "None dare breathe against their will."(220) Across the Atlantic there came the answer from the man who dared to breathe against their will.

If the price-level is kept stable, then the power of the moneyed interest must inevitably be broken. For no longer can the money power create by deflation a situation where there simply is not the money in existence with which to repay to it its debts. So long as the policy is one of keeping stable the price-level, then, as fast as the banks withdraw money from circulation, the Government issues out new money to take its place. Under the old system the banks lent out $100 million to the producers of the nation and demanded $105 million in repayment. But, as no money came into existence except as a loan, the extra $5 million did not anywhere exist. However efficient the producers, however great the increase of their productivity, it was mathematically impossible for them as a body to get out of debt or for any individual among them to get out of debt save by plunging some colleague yet more deeply into debt. The bankers protested that they were only too willing to lend if only they could find any credit-worthy borrowers. But it was their own system which made it mathematically impossible for borrowers to be credit-worthy. But under President Roosevelt's system an increased monetary supply, issued by the Government, is put out to purchase an increased quantity of goods. There is therefore, say, $150 million in circulation throughout the nation. The producers can repay their debts of $105 million and still have $45 million in their pockets. If you make two blades of grass grow where one grew before, you can, under President Roosevelt, sell for two pence what it only cost you a penny to produce. Under the old system all that happened was that the price of blades of grass fell to a halfpenny and you had to pay back to the money-lender twice as much, in terms of goods, as you had borrowed.

So long as the price-level is kept stable, it does not even greatly matter if, for political reasons, the Government should at first borrow its new money from the banks. For it can always break the money-power at whatever moment suits its purposes by demanding that the banks pay out their loans in cash, which, since they have promised to pay ten times more than they possess, they will be unable to do. The banks will then have no alternative but to ask the Government to guarantee their deposits, which the Government will do on condition that a dollar's debt is crossed off for every dollar guaranteed. Thus all money will become Government-issued money, and double-money will no longer exist. With the price-level stable inevitably the people will soon begin to get out of debt and the stranglehold of usury will be broken.

The policy to which President Roosevelt had committed himself was the policy to which the British National Government was already pledged at Ottawa. It was forced thus to pledge itself by the Dominions who, being exporters of foodstuffs which they sold on the London market, had, as has been said, suffered cruelly from the collapse of prices of primary products owing to British deflation. It is hardly too much to say that the condition of the continuance of the Empire was a guarantee that there would never again be another such collapse. President Roosevelt had therefore reason to think that on this high programme the ancient discord of the two countries could at last be forgotten. With this hope he agreed to send an American delegation to the World Economic Conference at London, agreeing that "the Conference must establish order in the place of the present chaos by the stabilization of currency."(221)

Now it is clear that by "stabilization" he meant stabilization of the price-level. And it is clear, too, that if all the nations agreed to keep stable their internal price-levels, the exchange values of their currencies, one against another, could not in nature oscillate very greatly. But it is clear also that, if they all agree to keep their exchange-values stable without any guarantee that internal price-levels will be kept stable and if one country is determined to force down its price-level, then all other countries will have to force down their price-levels too. Now France was a nervous creditor country with a mercantiist mentality. The lower the world price-level, the greater the value of the gold which she received. The lower the domestic price-level the less the amount of gold that would be required to back her domestic currency, the larger the amount that could be hoarded for foreign purchases in the day of the calamity of war.

President Roosevelt therefore meant by "stabilization" stabilization of price-level; the French meant stabilization of exchange-values. Remembering the policy to which they had already committed themselves at Ottawa, the President was entitled to expect that the British would be on his side. However in face of the rising German menace the British did not dare quarrel with the French. It is the strange, the incredible part of the business that London had itself created that menace by which it was terrified. For the money-lender must for ever go on lending. He will lend money to his mortal enemies to enable them to buy the guns to blow him to bits, sooner than not lend it at all — and that is precisely what the London financiers have done to Herr Hitler. "She has gone on buying wool, cotton, nickel, rubber, and petrol," writes the Stock Exchange Gazette of 3rd May, 1935, "until her requirements were fulfilled, and the financing has been done directly or indirectly through London." Yet the British, in spite of having created the power of Nazi Germany, were nevertheless terrified of it. Mr. Neville Chamberlain therefore affected not to understand the distinction between the two senses in which the word "stabilization" was used and, caring only that it should collapse, allowed the Americans to bear the odium of the Conference's collapse. As he put it, "President Roosevelt said that the Conference must establish order in the place of the present chaos by the stabilization of currency," and "as to the desirability of some permanent stabilization and ultimate stabilization he did not think that there could have been any difference among the delegates. The quotation he had already read showed what an important place it took in the mind of Mr. Roosevelt only a short time ago,"(222) — two statements which bear the marks of having been worded with some care so as to prevent the possibility of their having any meaning.

As soon as the Conference was safely dead, the British Empire delegates met and issued their Currency Manifesto. They demanded, first, the raising of the price-level to a figure that would cause debts to be repaid in money of the same value as that in which they were contracted. Then they resolved — "That the movement of price-levels towards the stabilization point must be measured by a Price Index, not by gold. That the stabilization of the exchanges depends on stabilization of prices. That stabilization of the exchanges is only possible with those countries adopting a common policy in regard to stabilization of prices.... That stabilization of prices and exchanges within the Empire must not be jeopardized by exchange commitments with any countries not pursuing the same price policy."(223)

It was the end of the old world.



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205. Intelligent Man's Guide to World Chaos, G. D. H. Cole, p. 240.

206. Rise and Fall of the Gold Standard, Morgan-Webb, p. 129.

207. Main Cause of Unemployment, Loftus, p. 37.

208. Ibid., p. 38-9.

209. America Self-Contained, Samuel Crowther, pp. 130, 131.

210. Speculation and Collapse in Wall Street, R.G. Hawtrey.

211. From Mr. Peek's report to President Roosevelt.

212. Intelligent Man's Guide Through World Chaos, G.D.H. Cole, p. 100.

213. See Hansard, vol. 256, col. 1272 (21st Sept., 1931). Mr. Owen asked:
"In view of the falling value of the pound and the fact that every other class singled out for a reduction has been granted a concession, will the Prime Minister now consider granting a concession to the unemployed?"
Mr. Ramsay MacDonald answered: "... The handling of the unemployment cuts was necessitated by special conditions of borrowing, and they must remain."

214. Op. cit.. Morgan-Webb, p. 107.

215. Art of Central Banking, 127.

216. Op. cit., Morgan-Webb, p. 127.

217. Ibid., p. 163.

218. Quoted by Ruskin, Unto This Last, 74 n.

219. Merchant of Venice, I, iii, 96-7.

220. Quadragesimo Anno.

221. Quoted from the speech of Mr. Neville Chamberlain, 10th July, 1933.

222. Op cit., Morgan-Webb, p. 131.

223. Summary by Morgan-Webb, op. cit., pp. 143, 144.