Sidney Bradshaw Fay :
The Origins of the World War (Vol 2)

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION


None of the Powers wanted a European War.  Their governing rulers and ministers, with very few exceptions, all foresaw that it must be a frightful struggle, in which the political results were not absolutely certain, but in which the loss of life, suffering, and economic consequences were bound to be terrible.  This is true, in a greater or less degree of Pashitch, Berchtold, Bethmann, Sazonov, Poincaré, San Giuliano and Sir Edward Grey.  Yet none of them, not even Sir Edward Grey, could have foreseen that the political results were to be so stupendous, and the other consequences so terrible, as was actually the case.

For many of the Powers, to be sure, a European War might seem to hold out the possibility of achieving various desired advantages;  for Serbia the achievement of national unity for all Serbs;  for Austria, the revival of her waning prestige as a Great Power, and the checking of nationalistic tendencies which threatened her very existence;  for Russia, the accomplishment of her historic mission of controlling Constantinople and the Straits, for Germany, new economic advantages and the restoration of the European balance which had changed with the weakening of the Triple Alliance and tightening of the Triple Entente;  for France, the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine and the ending of the German menace;  and for England, the destruction of the German naval danger and of Prussian militarism.  All these advantages, and many others, were feverishly striven and intrigued for, on all sides, the moment the War actually broke out, but this is no good proof that any of the statesmen mentioned deliberately aimed to bring about a war to secure these advantages.  One cannot judge the motives which actuated men before the War, by what they did in an absolutely new situation which arose as soon as they were overtaken by a conflagration they had sought to avert.  And in fact, in the case of the two Powers between whom the immediate conflict arose, the postponement or avoidance of a European war would have facilitated the accomplishment of the ultimate advantages aimed at;  Pashitch knew that there was a better chance for Serbian national unity after he had consolidated Serbian gains in the Balkan Wars, and after Russia had completed her military and naval armaments as planned for 1917 ;  and Berchtold knew that he had a better chance of crushing the Greater Serbia danger and strengthening Austria, if he could avoid Russian intervention and a general European War.

It is also true, likewise, that the moment war was declared, it was hailed with varying demonstrations of enthusiasm on the part of the people in every country—with considerable in Serbia, Austria, Russia and Germany, with less in France, and with almost none in England.  But this does not mean that the peoples wanted war or exerted a decisive influence to bring it about.  It is a curious psychological phenomenon that as soon as a country engages in war, there develops or is created among the masses a frenzy of patriotic excitement which is no index of their pre-war desires.  And in the countries where the demonstrations of enthusiasm were greatest, the political influence of the people on the Government was least.

Nevertheless, a European War broke out.  Why ?  Because in each country political and military leaders did certain things, which led to mobilizations and declarations of war, or failed to do certain things which might have prevented them.  In this sense, all the European countries, in a greater or less degree, were responsible.  One must abandon the dictum of the Versailles Treaty that Germany and her allies were solely responsible.  It was a dictum exacted by victors from vanquished, under the influence of the blindness, ignorance, hatred, and the propagandist misconceptions to which war had given rise.  It was based on evidence which was incomplete and not always sound.(1)  It is generally recognized by the best historical scholars in all countries to be no longer tenable or defensible.  They are agreed that the responsibility for the War is a divided responsibility.  But they still disagree very much as to the relative part of this responsibility that falls on each country and on each individual political or military leader.

Some writers like to fix positively in some precise mathematical fashion the exact responsibility for the war.  This was done in one way by the framers of Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles.  It has been done in other ways by hose who would fix the responsibility in some relative fashion, as, for instance, Austria first, then Russia, France and Germany and England.  But the present writer deprecates such efforts to assess by a precise formula a very complicated question, which is after all more a matter of delicate shading than of definite white and black.  Oversimplification, as Napoleon once said in framing his Code, is the enemy of precision.  Moreover, even supposing that a general consensus of opinion might be reached as to the relative responsibility of any individual country or man for immediate causes connected with the July crisis of 1914, it is by no means necessarily true that the same relative responsibility would hold for the underlying causes, which for years had been tending toward the creation of a dangerous situation.

One may, however, sum up very briefly the most salient facts in regard to each country.

Serbia felt a natural and justifiable impulse to do what so many other countries had done in the nineteenth century—to bring under one national Government all the discontented Serb people.  She had liberated those under Turkish rule;  the next step was to liberate those under Hapsburg rule.  She looked to Russia for assistance, and had been encouraged to expect that she would receive it.  After the assassination, Mr. Pashitch took no steps to discover and bring to justice Serbians in Belgrade who had been implicated in the plot.  One of them, Ciganovitch, was even assisted to disappear.  Mr. Pashitch waited to see what evidence the Austrian authorities could find.  When Austria demanded coöperation of Austrian officials in discovering, though not in trying, implicated Serbians, the Serbian Government made a very conciliatory but negative reply.  They expected that the reply would not be regarded as satisfactory, and, even before it was given, ordered the mobilization of the Serbian army.  Serbia did not want war, but believed it would be forced upon her.  That Mr. Pashitch was aware of the plot three weeks before it was executed, failed to take effective steps to prevent the assassins from crossing over from Serbia to Bosnia, and then failed to give Austria any warning or information which might have averted the fatal crime, were facts unknown to Austria in July, 1914;  they cannot therefore be regarded as in any way justifying Austria's conduct;  but they are part of Serbia's responsibility, and a very serious part.

Austria was more responsible for the immediate origin of the war than any other Power.  Yet from her own point of view she was acting in self-defense—not against an immediate military attack, but against the corroding Greater Serbia and Jugoslav agitation which her leaders believed threatened her very existence.  No State can be expected to sit with folded arms and await dismemberment at the hands of its neighbors.  Russia was believed to be intriguing with Serbia and Rumania against the Dual Monarchy.  The assassination of the heir to the throne, as a result of a plot prepared in Belgrade, demanded severe retribution ;  otherwise Austria would be regarded as incapable of action, “worm-eaten” as the Serbian Press expressed it, would sink in prestige, and hasten her own downfall.  To avert this Berchtold determined to crush Serbia with war.  He deliberately framed the ultimatum with the expectation and hope that it would be rejected.  He hurriedly declared war against Serbia in order to forestall all efforts at mediation.  He refused even to answer his own ally's urgent requests to come to an understanding with Russia, on the basis of a military occupation of Belgrade as a pledge that Serbia would carry out the promises in her reply to the ultimatum.  Berchtold gambled on a “local” war with Serbia only, believing that he could rattle the German sword ;  but rather than abandon his war with Serbia, he was ready to drag the rest of Europe into war.

It is very questionable whether Berchtold's obstinate determination to diminish Serbia and destroy her as a Balkan factor was, after all, the right method, even if he had succeeded in keeping the war “localized” and in temporarily strengthening the Dual Monarchy.  Supposing that Russia in 1914, because of military unpreparedness or lack of support, had been ready to tolerate the execution of Berchtold's designs, it is quite certain that she would have aimed within the next two or three years at wiping out this second humiliation, which was so much more damaging to her prestige than that of 1908-09.  In two or three years, when her great program of military reform was finally completed, Russia would certainly have found a pretext to reverse the balance in the Balkans in her own favor again.  A further consequence of Berchtold's policy, even if successful, would have been the still closer consolidation of the Triple Entente, with the possible addition of Italy.  And, finally, a partially dismembered Serbia would have become a still greater source of unrest and danger to the peace of Europe than heretofore.  Serbian nationalism, like Polish nationalism, would have been intensified by partition.  Austrian power and prestige would not have been so greatly increased as to be able to meet these new dangers.  Berchtold's plan was a mere temporary improvement, but could not be a final solution of the Austro-Serbian antagonism.  Franz Ferdinand and many others recognized this, and so long as he lived, no step in this fatal direction had been taken.  It was the tragic fate of Austria that the only man who might have had the power and ability to develop Austria along sound lines became the innocent victim of the crime which was the occasion of the World War and so of her ultimate disruption.

Germany did not plot a European War, did not want one, and made genuine, though too belated efforts, to avert one.  She was the victim of her alliance with Austria and of her own folly.  Austria was her only dependable ally, Italy and Rumania having become nothing but allies in name.  She could not throw her over, as otherwise she would stand isolated between Russia, where Panslavism and armaments were growing stronger every year, and France, where Alsace-Lorraine, Delcassé's fall and Agadir were not forgotten.  Therefore, Bethmann felt bound to accede to Berchtold's request for support and gave him a free hand to deal with Serbia ;  he also hoped and expected to “localize” the Austro-Serbian conflict.  Germany then gave grounds to the Entente for suspecting the sincerity of her peaceful intentions by her denial of any foreknowledge of the ultimatum, by her support and justification of it when it was published, and by her refusal of Sir Edward Grey's conference proposal.  However, Germany by no means had Austria so completely under her thumb as the Entente Powers and many writers have assumed.  It is true that Berchtold would hardly have embarked on his gambler's policy unless he had been assured that Germany would fulfil the obligations of the alliance, and to this extent Germany must share the great responsibility of Austria.  But when Bethmann realized that Russia was likely to intervene, that England might not remain neutral, and that there was danger of a world war of which Germany and Austria would appear to be the instigators, he tried to call a halt on Austria, but it was too late.  He pressed mediation proposals on Vienna, but Berchtold was insensible to the pressure, and the Entente Powers did not believe in the sincerity of his pressure, especially as they produced no results.

Germany's geographical position between France and Russia, and her inferiority in number of troops, had made necessary the plan of crushing the French army quickly first and then turning against Russia.  This was only possible, in the opinion of her strategists, by marching through Belgium, as it was generally anticipated by military men that she would do in case of a European War.  On July 29, after Austria had declared war on Serbia, and after the Tsar had assented to general mobilization in Russia (though this was not known in Berlin and was later postponed for a day owing to the Kaiser's telegram to the Tsar), Bethmann took the precaution of sending to the German Minister in Brussels a sealed envelope.  The Minister was not to open it except on further instructions.  It contained the later demand for the passage of the German army through Belgium.  This does not mean, however, that Germany had decided for war.  In fact, Bethmann was one of the last of the statesmen to abandon hope of peace and to consent to the mobilization of his country's army.  General mobilization of the continental armies took place in the following order :  Serbia, Russia, Austria, France and Germany.  General mobilization by a Great Power was commonly interpreted by military men in every country, though perhaps not by Sir Edward Grey, the Tsar, and some civilian officials, as meaning that the country was on the point of making war,—that the military machine had begun to move and would not be stopped.  Hence, when Germany learned of the Russian general mobilization, she sent ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris, warning that German mobilization would follow unless Russia suspended hers within twelve hours, and asking what would be the attitude of France.  The answers being unsatisfactory, Germany then mobilized and declared war.  It was the hasty Russian general mobilization, assented to on July 29 and ordered on July 30, while Germany was still trying to bring Austria to accept mediation proposals, which finally rendered the European War inevitable.

Russia was partly responsible for the Austro-Serbian conflict because of the frequent encouragement which she had given at Belgrade—that Serbian national unity would be ultimately achieved with Russian assistance at Austrian expense.  This had led the Belgrade Cabinet to hope for Russian support in case of a war with Austria, and the hope did not prove vain in July, 1914.  Before this, to be sure, in the Bosnian Crisis and during the Balkan Wars, Russia had put restraint upon Serbia, because Russia, exhausted by the effects of the Russo-Japanese War, was not yet ready for a European struggle with the Teutonic Powers.  But in, 1914 her armaments, though not yet completed, had made such progress that the militarists were confident of success, if they had French and British support.  In the spring of 1914, the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, had published an article in a Russian newspaper, though without signing his name, to the effect, “Russia is ready, France must be ready also.”  Austria was convinced that Russia would ultimately aid Serbia, unless the Serbian danger were dealt with energetically after the Archduke's murder ;  she knew that Russia was growing stronger every year ;  but she doubted whether the Tsar's armaments had yet reached the point at which Russia would dare to intervene ;  she would therefore run less risk of Russian intervention and a European War if she used the Archduke's assassination as an excuse for weakening Serbia, than if she should postpone action until the future.

Russia's responsibility lay also in the secret preparatory military measures which she was making at the same time that she was carrying on diplomatic negotiations.  These alarmed Germany and Austria.  But it was primarily Russia's general mobilization, made when Germany was trying to bring Austria to a settlement, which precipitated the final catastrophe, causing Germany to mobilize and declare war.

The part of France is less clear than that of the other Great Powers, because she has not yet made a full publication of her documents.  To be sure, M. Poincaré, in the fourth volume of his memoirs, has made a skillful and elaborate plea, to prove “La France innocente.”  But he is not convincing.  It is quite clear that on his visit to Russia he assured the Tsar's Government that France would support her as an ally in preventing Austria from humiliating or crushing Serbia.  Paléologue renewed these assurances in a way to encourage Russia to take a strong hand.  He did not attempt to restrain Russia from military measures which he knew would call forth German counter-measures and cause war.  Nor did he keep his Government promptly and fully informed of the military steps which were being taken at St. Petersburg.  President Poincaré, upon his return to France, made efforts for peace, but his great preoccupation was to minimize French and Russian preparatory measures and emphasize those of Germany, in order to secure the certainty of British support in a struggle which he now regarded as inevitable.

Sir Edward Grey made many sincere proposals for preserving peace;  they all failed owing partly, but not exclusively, to Germany's attitude.  Sir Edward could probably have prevented war if he had done either of two things.  If, early in the crisis, he had acceded to the urging of France and Russia and given a strong warning to Germany that, in a European War, England would take the side of the Franco-Russian Alliance, this would probably have led Bethmann to exert an earlier and more effective pressure on Austria;  and it would perhaps thereby have prevented the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, and brought to successful issue the “direct conversations” between Vienna and St. Petersburg.  Or, if Sir Edward Grey had listened to German urging, and warned France and Russia early in the crisis that if they became involved in war, England would remain neutral, probably Russia would have hesitated with her mobilizations, and France would probably have exerted a restraining influence at St. Petersburg.  But Sir Edward Grey could not say that England would take the side of France and Russia, because he had a Cabinet nearly evenly divided, and he was not sure, early in the crisis, that public opinion in England would back him up in war against Germany.  He could resign, and he says in his memoirs that he would have resigned, but that would have been no comfort or aid to France, who had come confidently to count upon British support. He was determined to say and do nothing which might encourage her with a hope which he could not fulfil.  Therefore, in spite of the pleadings of the French, he refused to give them definite assurances until the probable German determination to go through Belgium made it clear that the Cabinet, and Parliament, and British public opinion would follow his lead in war on Germany.  On the other hand, he was unwilling to heed the German pledges that he exercise restraint at Paris and St. Petersburg, because he did not wish to endanger the Anglo-Russian Entente and the solidarity of the Triple Entente, because he felt a moral obligation to France, growing out of the Anglo-French military and naval conversations of the past years, and because he suspected that Germany was backing Austria up in an unjustifiable course and that Prussian militarists had taken the direction of affairs at Berlin out of the hands of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and the civilian authorities.

Italy exerted relatively little influence on the crisis in either direction.

Belgium had done nothing in any way to justify the demand which Germany made upon her.  With commendable prudence, at the very first news of the ominous Austrian ultimatum, she had foreseen the danger to which she might be exposed.  She had accordingly instructed her representatives abroad as to the statements which they were to make in case Belgium should decide very suddenly to mobilize to protect her neutrality.  On July 29, she placed her army upon “a strengthened war footing,” but did not order complete mobilization until two days later, when Austria, Russia, and Germany had already done so, and war appeared inevitable.  Even after being confronted with the terrible German ultimatum, at 7 P.M. on August 2, she did not at once invite the assistance of English and French troops to aid her in the defense of her soil and her neutrality against a certain German assault;  it was not until German troops had actually violated her territory, on August 4, that she appealed for the assistance of the Powers which had guaranteed her neutrality.  Belgium was the innocent victim of German strategic necessity.  Though the German violation of Belgium was of enormous influence in forming public opinion as to the responsibility for the War after hostilities began, it was not a cause of the War, except in so far as it made it easier for Sir Edward Grey to bring England into it.

In the fourty years following the Franco-Prussian War, as we have seen, there developed a system of alliances which divided Europe into two hostile groups.  This hostility was accentuated by the increase of armaments, economic rivalry, nationalist ambitions and antagonisms, and newspaper incitement.  But it is very doubtful whether all these dangerous tendencies would have actually led to war, had it not been for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.  That was the factor which consolidated the elements of hostility and started the rapid and complicated succession of events which culminated in a World War, and for that factor Serbian nationalism was primarily responsible.

But the verdict of the Versailles Treaty that Germany and her allies were responsible for the War, in view of the evidence now available, is historically unsound.  It should therefore be revised.  However, because of the popular feeling widespread in some of the Entente countries, it is doubtful whether a formal and legal revision by historical scholars, and through them of public opinion.


1. For a recent analysis of the evidence laid before the Commission on Responsibility for the War at the Paris Peace Conference and the untenability of the conclusions based upon it, see A. von Wegerer, “Die Wiederlegung der Versailles Kriegsschuldthese,” in Die Kriegsschuldsrage, VI, 1-77, Jan., 1928;  also his article, with replies to it, in Current History, Aug., 1928, pp. 810-828.